War in the Middle East and the risk of fuel shortages
Atlantico: Mike Wirth, Chevron's boss, warns about a risk of a global oil surge while Patrick Pouyanné assures that France will not miss oil: are these two speeches really contradictory or are they actually talking about two different dimensions of the energy crisis?
Jean-Pierre Favennec : Chevron's boss is very worried about the risk of oil spills. According to him, the US market is likely to be seriously threatened this summer if the crisis continues. He therefore adopted a rather alarmist position, evoking a crisis likely to occur this summer. Patrick Pouyanné, on the other hand, does not really talk about shortage. Instead, it considers that we will pay the price of this crisis in the form of higher tariffs. According to him, there will be oil, but at a higher price.
Patrick Pouyanné took a cautious position and explained, in essence, that TotalEnergies would feed the French oil market and ensure that French refineries had enough oil to refine.
French refineries alone cannot supply all the diesel oil and, more importantly, all the kerosene needed for the French market. I therefore believe that he is committed to ensuring this supply through the trading network available to TotalEnergys.
Patrick Pouyanné takes a cautious, rather serene position of saying that the company will do its job, that the system will work and that there is no reason to worry. It should also be recalled that the General Meeting of TotalEnergys was held this Friday.
Chevron's speech is diametrically opposed. The company believes that there will be difficulties in the market. For now, the war in the Middle East and especially the closure of the Strait of Ormuz are of particular concern. However, it is not clear how the situation will evolve, particularly in the light of the American position.
The way Donald Trump manages this situation makes the outlook difficult to interpret. There are fairly intense negotiations between Americans and Iranians. The Ormuz Strait will eventually be reopened. However, as many pointed out, Iranians are not in a hurry. They are supported by Chinese and Russians. To the extent that this situation bothers the Americans, it can last.
If this situation continues for a few weeks or more, we will enter a phase where real problems will arise. This is becoming more and more likely.
Moreover, Patrick Pouyanné himself points out that stocks are falling quite rapidly. They dropped by a billion barrels. This decrease is far from negligible. It accounts for several tens of percent of initial stocks.
This justifies, to a certain extent, the position of the leader of Chevron, who believes that we are moving towards a serious crisis because, after some time, we will eventually run out of oil.
The United States is not really involved in the short term. They now produce enough oil on their territory to feed their domestic market. US consumption is about 20 million barrels per day and domestic production is now close to that. And even if that wasn't enough, neighbouring Canada is only asking to sell its oil in the United States.
At the global level, however, we could indeed face difficulties if the Strait of Ormuz remained blocked. Approximately 10 million barrels per day pass through this area. This represents a considerable share of global needs. Therefore, it will not be possible to compensate for this loss on a sustainable basis only by drawing on strategic deployment stocks, which will also be depleted.
- Patrick Pouyanné explains that there will be a prize at this non-penury. In concrete terms, what does this mean for Europeans? Should we expect new energy inflation, a sustainable increase in fuels and an economic weakening of Europe? Are we heading for an oil surge to come this summer and what will the American-Iranian iron arm cost Europeans at the pump?
Patrick Pouyanné himself points out that no one really expected the closure of the Strait of Ormuz. Of course, this assumption has been in the minds of oil experts for a long time. There have already been threats during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, as well as a partial closure of the Ormuz Strait. However, these episodes have never lasted and have never caused a problem of a magnitude comparable to what we currently know. It's a new phenomenon.
When this scenario was mentioned twenty or thirty years ago, oil prices of up to 150, 200 or even 250 dollars per barrel were imagined. Today, the price of oil has risen from about $60 to a maximum of $110.
This price level is not acceptable. However, it is now apparent that the markets anticipate an improvement in the situation. Negotiations appear to be progressing and many expect a more or less rapid reopening of the Strait. The price of the barrel fell below the $100 mark. I would not qualify this level as reasonable, but rather acceptable in the current context. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that fuel prices have risen by 20 to 40 per cent.
Gasoline and diesel prices are likely to fall slightly, but will certainly not return to the levels observed before 28 February. That seems very clear. Fuel prices are expected to remain 20 to 30 per cent higher than their previous level, at least for some time.
Even if the Strait of Ormuz is reopened, there is still uncertainty: we know very little about the extent of the damage caused by the Iranian strikes in the various Arab countries. While these strikes have mainly affected oil production facilities, repairs can be relatively rapid. In this case, once the strait is reopened, crude oil flows could resume normally.
However, the Gulf producing countries have for several years developed a strategy of building significant refining capacity on the spot. A significant proportion of the oil produced is now refined locally. However, some of these refineries have suffered damage, without knowing exactly which ones or to what extent.
This directly affects the global supply of diesel and kerosene. In particular, it explains why the price of kerosene has risen dramatically, from about 700 to 800 dollars per tonne to almost double or more.
Even if the Strait of Ormuz is reopened and the flow of crude oil becomes sufficient, tensions may persist on refined petroleum products. A significant part of the global supply of diesel and kerosene comes from refineries in the Persian Gulf, whose real state remains poorly known.
- Is the US market likely to face supply difficulties this summer if the crisis continues as the Chevron leader fears?
I would rather say no, with some reservations. Looking at the overall figures, the US market consumes about 20 million barrels a day, while domestic production reaches a comparable level. Even if the difference were one or two million barrels a day, neighbouring Canada would be able to provide the missing volumes without major difficulty. Rather, the most sensitive issue is the quality of oil produced in the United States. Shale oil has special characteristics.
In particular, there are large, sophisticated refineries in the southern United States, designed to treat relatively heavy crude oil, often imported from the Persian Gulf or, previously, Venezuela.
Although U.S. production is now equivalent to domestic consumption, the U.S. continues to export some of its light oil while importing some heavier oil. This situation is explained by industrial choices dating back to a time when the country lacked oil and sought to transform the lowest possible crude oil, often heavy oil.
It is therefore possible that problems of balance and adaptation of oil qualities may arise. However, I do not think they are dramatic. In my view, the United States should not face any real supply difficulties at the level of a few weeks or even a few months.
On the other hand, as Patrick Pouyanné rightly points out, the market for petroleum products is a global market. The cost of transporting oil and refined products remains relatively low, contributing to price unification internationally.
That is why the price of gasoline in the United States has risen from just over two dollars a gallon to about four dollars today. Some even believe that it could increase further if the crisis continues.
This is the real issue. It is also a major problem for Donald Trump, who has every interest in lowering the price of gasoline in order to maintain its popularity with US voters and avoid adverse political consequences in the coming election deadlines.
- In the face of rising prices at the pump, several indicators already show that the French adapt their behaviour and are less fuelling. Is there a risk of a snowball effect due to consumer expectations? Should prices continue to rise, they could further change their consumption habits, which could weaken the economy and different sectors such as catering or large distribution?
This phenomenon can already be seen. Figures published on the first 20 days of May show that consumption of petroleum products decreased by around 15%, which is considerable. This decline is all the more significant as it occurred over a period of several extended weekends, traditionally conducive to travel and vacation departures.
The impact is therefore very important. The French seek to reduce their consumption of petrol and, in fact, reduce it effectively. A whole series of new economic behaviour seems to be in place.
This will gradually affect all economic sectors. Indeed, closing the Strait of Ormuz means less oil available, which also means less fertilizer, fewer plastics and fewer other petroleum products. Thus, diffuse inflation is likely to spread throughout the economy.
Additional inflation in the range of 2 to 4 per cent related to this situation is mentioned. As long as the price of oil remains around $80 to $90 per barrel, compared to about $60 before the crisis, an automatic price increase of several percentage points is expected.
In this context, consumers' natural reaction will be to reduce their spending: less fuel consumed, less travel and, more generally, more prudent consumption.
- How has Ormuz Strait become the true heart of the global geopolitical problem? Why is a lasting disturbance in this area sufficient to destabilize the entire oil market even without immediate shortage?
Between 10 and 15 million barrels of oil pass through Ormuz Strait every day. This means that between 10 and 15 per cent of the usual global oil supply is directly concerned. However, there are two ways to partially circumvent this constraint. The main pipeline is through Saudi Arabia and allows oil to be exported not from the Persian Gulf terminals but from the Red Sea coast. Its capacity is around 6 to 7 million barrels per day, which remains considerable.
The United Arab Emirates has also built a more recent pipeline to bypass the Strait of Ormuz. It links the oil fields of Abu Dhabi, located on the Persian Gulf, to the port of Fujairah, on the Gulf of Oman.
These two infrastructures thus partially reduce the impact of a closure of the strait. Instead of a potential shortfall of 15 million barrels per day, the shortfall could be reduced to about 10 million barrels per day. However, this remains extremely important. In the short term, there is no real solution. Building new pipelines takes several years. There is therefore no immediate response to this problem.
Chevron claims that the amortization mechanisms of the oil market are now largely exhausted: US strategic stocks have been started, world reserves are decreasing and tensions accumulated since the war in Ukraine continue to weigh. Is the global energy system today more vulnerable than it was in 2022?
I do think he's more vulnerable. Strategic stocks began to be used in the first few weeks of the crisis. It should be recalled that these stocks were established following the first oil shock in 1973, after the Kippur War.
At that time, oil prices had increased from about $3 to $10 per barrel and producing countries had threatened to implement an oil embargo. The Middle East then accounted for nearly 50 per cent of the world's oil supply, which was a source of serious concern.
OECD member countries then established the International Energy Agency. The mission of the organization was to deal with possible shortages or an oil embargo. In particular, it has put in place mechanisms for the distribution of oil among member countries to prevent a state from becoming in a critical situation.
The second important step was to build up strategic stocks for approximately three months of consumption. When the Middle East war began, these stocks were naturally filled. However, their qualification as "strategic" reminds us that they are intended for use only in exceptional situations.
Comparison is imperfect, but strategic stocks work a bit like nuclear deterrence. It is often said that nuclear weapons are useful only as long as they are not used. On the day it is used, the consequences are considerable. There is therefore a deterrent dimension.
Strategic stocks have a comparable logic. Historically, they have been mobilized very rarely, precisely because their use means that the situation is serious.
However, a few weeks after the crisis began, the International Energy Agency asked OECD consumer countries to release some of their strategic stocks. These reserves are therefore gradually being used.
Strategic stocks are not inexhaustible. They still allow several months without major difficulty. However, the problem remains: about 10 million barrels of oil are missing per day in the world market, or nearly 10 per cent of the usual supply. This deficit must therefore be compensated.
- The return of the debate on oil "super-profits" has reinvigorated discussions about an exceptional taxation of TotalEnergys. Is this controversy politically and economically relevant or is it likely, on the contrary, to further weaken European energy sovereignty in an already highly unstable global context?
The taxation of superprofits is indeed one of the themes regularly highlighted in the public debate. In France, we sometimes tend to forget that we are not alone in the world. We no longer live in a closed system, protected from the rest of the world economy. Whether we like it or not, we are now in a largely open economy.
In this context, if a company such as TotalEnergy is taxed excessively, investors can choose to direct their capital to other companies or to other markets. This is a reality of international competition.
TotalEnergies is competing with several major oil companies worldwide. Its managers must also meet their shareholders' expectations for profitability.
Therefore, taxation deemed excessive could weaken the attractiveness of the group. Moreover, a few years ago, TotalEnergies mentioned the possibility of transferring its headquarters or certain activities to New York, where a significant part of its shareholding is located.
The company is currently making a significant effort by capping certain prices. Patrick Pouyanné had also indicated that additional taxation could undermine this policy. However, he has just announced the continuation of this mechanism.
I believe that this measure is positive for consumers, although it raises some competition issues with other market players.
- In view of the analyses of Patrick Pouyanné and Chevron, why is energy so strategic at the heart of this geopolitical crisis? To what extent could the responses of US and European actors, including TotalEnergys, contribute to a gradual resolution of the situation?
We live in an energy system where oil continues to play an essential role. Whether it pleases or not, this reality remains. Electric vehicles are progressing, but they will not represent the bulk of the fleet in the immediate future. Moreover, their development itself raises other problems.
Oil remains a central element of the global economy. Historically, it has always been of considerable geopolitical importance. About 80% of the world's oil reserves are in OPEC member countries. Nearly half of the world's reserves are concentrated in five countries around the Persian Gulf: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
This geological and geopolitical reality cannot be changed. Although oil is produced in other parts of the world, a significant proportion of the world's supply remains dependent on these states.
This situation also reminds us of our dependence on other major producers, such as Russia, which remains a major player in the world oil market.